Comparing Literary and Biblical Hermeneutics to Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation by Pushaw, Robert J., Jr.
Pepperdine Law Review 
Volume 47 




Comparing Literary and Biblical Hermeneutics to Constitutional 
and Statutory Interpretation 
Robert J. Pushaw Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Religion Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert J. Pushaw Jr. Comparing Literary and Biblical Hermeneutics to Constitutional and Statutory 
Interpretation, 47 Pepp. L. Rev. 463 (2020) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol47/iss2/15 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine 




Comparing Literary and Biblical 
Hermeneutics to Constitutional and 
Statutory Interpretation 
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.* 
Abstract 
 
 Interpreters determine the meaning of language.  To interpret 
literary and biblical texts, scholars have developed detailed rules, 
methods, and theories of human understanding.  This branch of 
knowledge, “hermeneutics,” features three basic approaches.  
First, “textualists” treat words as directly conveying their ordinary 
meaning to a competent reader today.  Second, “contextualists” 
maintain that verbal meaning depends on generally shared linguis-
tic conventions in the particular historical and cultural environment 
of the author—and that therefore translations or commentaries are 
necessary to make the writing intelligible to a modern reader.  
Third, “hermeneutic circle” scholars argue that texts have no ob-
jective meaning.  Rather, a person’s subjective perspectives and 
norms affect his or her understanding of a text, which then generates 
new meanings that in turn may influence future readers. 
 These three methodologies have parallels in the legal field.  
Most importantly, judges and scholars have interpreted the United 
States Constitution by employing (1) textualism, (2) originalism—
discerning the meaning of constitutional provisions in historical 
 
 * James Wilson Endowed Professor, Pepperdine Caruso School of Law.  This article grew out 
of the Kamm Memorial Lecture at Wheaton College in April 2019.  I am grateful to the Wheaton 
students and faculty, especially Steve Bretsen, for their insightful questions and comments.  I am hon-
ored to contribute to a symposium dedicated to the superb work of my friend Bob Cochran. 
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context, or (3) subjective “living constitutionalism.”  Similarly, fed-
eral statutes have been analyzed by applying textualism, context-
based pragmatism, or freewheeling “dynamic interpretation.” 
 In this Essay, I will begin by summarizing the three main ap-
proaches to literary and biblical hermeneutics.  I will then explore 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Interpretation is the process of determining the meaning of words.  To 
interpret literary, biblical, and legal texts, scholars have developed and applied 
myriad rules, methods, and theories of human understanding—“hermeneu-
tics.”1  A detailed treatment of this subject would require volumes.  In this 
brief essay, therefore, I must oversimplify analysis.2  Initially, I will describe 
three basic approaches to literary and biblical hermeneutics.3  I will then show 
how those methodologies have parallels in the interpretation of the federal 
Constitution and statutes.4 
 
 1. See, e.g., Donald K. McKim, Approaches to Contemporary Hermeneutics: Major Emphases 
in Biblical Interpretation, in A GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS 86, 86 (Donald K. McKim 
ed., 1986); Peter Szondi & Timothy Bahti, Introduction to Literary Hermeneutics, 10 NEW LITERARY 
HIST. 17, 17 (1978), https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/468303.pdf. 
 2. This Essay is intended primarily for generalists.  Accordingly, I will set forth (1) a radically 
distilled version of my published work on constitutional and statutory interpretation, and (2) an ele-
mentary summary of literary and biblical hermeneutics.  Moreover, I recognize that many scholars 
have applied such hermeneutics to illuminate understanding of the Constitution and statutes.  Although 
I cannot engage all of this literature, four sources deserve special note. 
  First, Professor Garet has argued that hermeneutics often has a “normative” dimension because 
readers invest certain texts with a unique authority and value that prompts moral reflection and action: 
The Bible provides spiritual and ethical guidance; the Constitution aims to promote justice and the 
common good; and serious fiction can awaken our moral sensibilities.  See Ronald R. Garet, Compar-
ative Normative Hermeneutics: Scripture, Literature, Constitution, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 37, 37–54 
(1985).  In all three areas, however, interpreters have disagreed about whether the focus should be on 
the text alone or rather supplemented by tradition and the opinions of an authoritative institution.  See 
id. at 48–134. 
  Second, a renowned scholar of Christian history has provided an especially valuable comparison 
of biblical and constitutional hermeneutics.  See JAROSLAV PELIKAN, INTERPRETING THE BIBLE AND 
THE CONSTITUTION (2004).  His many insights will be cited throughout this essay. 
  Third, an eminent law professor has analogized the Constitution to a sacred text.  See SANFORD 
LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).  In particular, Professor Levinson emphasizes that both 
documents are written, enduring, and treated as the highest authority.  Id. at 9–53. 
  Fourth, serious studies applying Literary Theory to legal texts (especially the Constitution) began 
in the late 1970s and flourished over the next two decades, but have gradually declined in influence.  
See RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE (3d ed. 2009).  The main problem is that various “crit-
ical” approaches, which posit that the reading of texts is inherently subjective, have not been accepted 
by attorneys or judges because their profession assumes that laws have an objectively ascertainable 
meaning. 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. See infra Part III. 
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II.  LITERARY AND BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION 
A. Textualism 
One naturally understands a text to convey its perceived ordinary mean-
ing, which often triggers an immediate and personal response.5  For example, 
any competent reader can quickly grasp the mastery of storytelling and style 
exhibited by Homer, Dante, or the Bronte sisters.  An intellectual can provide 
further insights, but these classical works speak directly to us across the cen-
turies. 
Similarly, people can look at a biblical story and intuitively get a direct 
message that is relevant to their lives.6  For instance, when Jesus is on the 
cross and sees his many tormentors, he says: “Father, forgive them, for they 
do not know what they are doing.”7  The meaning is obvious and visceral: If 
Christ can seek forgiveness for those who mocked and crucified him, we 
should be able to pardon far lesser offenses. 
In short, the benefit of an immediate, subjective response to a literary or 
biblical text is that we receive an unfiltered message, as if the author is ad-
dressing us individually.8  This simple approach, however, can easily lead us 
astray, for three reasons. 
First, readers tend to take words literally in their linguistic and grammat-
ical sense.  The author, however, may have intended an allegorical, symbolic, 
or spiritual meaning.9 
Second, almost everyone today will be mistaken about certain language 
 
 5. See, e.g., RAY JACKENDOFF, A USER’S GUIDE TO THOUGHT AND MEANING 38–40 (2012). 
 6. See McKim, supra note 1, at 86–87 (discussing this “intuitive” approach); Richard N. Soulen 
& R. Kendall Soulen, Hermeneutics, in HANDBOOK OF BIBLICAL CRITICISM 73–75 (4th ed. 2011) 
(noting that pre-modern hermeneutics assumed that biblical texts contained eternal truths that were 
always applicable and that this traditional approach has survived in certain conservative Christian 
circles). 
 7. Luke 23:34. 
 8. See, e.g., RAYMOND W. GIBBS, JR., INTENTIONS IN THE EXPERIENCE OF MEANING 7–8 (1999).  
This idea fueled the Protestant Reformation, as Martin Luther and others contended that (1) Scripture 
alone was the source of religious doctrine, and (2) individuals could legitimately interpret the Bible, 
unaided by Church authorities (contrary to Catholic teaching).  See LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 18–
19, 24–27; PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 2, 28, 40, 45–47, 66, 86, 100–02, 110, 116; Garet, supra note 2, 
at 45–46, 48-49, 52–55, 58–59, 61–62, 67, 70–75, 81–82, 92–93. 
 9. See Szondi & Bahti, supra note 1, at 21–25; McKim, supra note 1, at 87; PELIKAN, supra note 
2, at 43–44; Soulen & Soulen, supra note 6, at 74; Georgia Warnke, Hermeneutics, OXFORD RES. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LITERATURE 1, 1–14 (2016), https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190201098. 
013.114. 
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in older writings, particularly figures of speech that have no modern cur-
rency.10  To illustrate, Jesus proclaimed: “[I]t is easier for a camel to pass 
through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of 
God.”11   A camel cannot fit through the hole at the end of a needle, so one 
would instinctively conclude that it’s impossible for a rich person to get to 
heaven.  By historical and contemporary global standards, most Americans 
are “rich,” so Christian Americans are in big trouble—unless “eye of the nee-
dle” had a different meaning in its time and place. 
Third, sometimes words can be distorted to mean whatever the reader 
wishes, especially if they are considered in isolation.12  Consider a famous line 
from Shakespeare: “The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers.”13  That 
statement apparently condemns attorneys as so evil that they should be mur-
dered.  Likewise, Jesus declared: “The poor you will always have with 
you . . . .”14  On its face, that remark indicates that poverty is a permanent fact 
of life, which might suggest not bothering to help poor folks.  As we will see, 
both of those facially plausible interpretations are incorrect.15 
The foregoing problems have led to a different approach.  Most modern 
scholars examine words not in a vacuum, but rather in their linguistic, literary, 
and historical context. 
B. Contextualism 
Linguists, who scientifically study the nature and functions of language, 
have influenced hermeneuticists to posit that the meaning of words depends 
on generally understood language-related conventions in the particular histor-
ical and cultural environment of the writer and reader.16  Accordingly, these 
scholars initially seek to discover that original “grammatical” understanding, 
 
 10. See Szondi & Bahti, supra note 1, at 21–23 (describing how literary interpreters change words 
in classical works, like Homer’s epics, to make them comprehensible to contemporary readers). 
 11. Matthew 19:24. 
 12. “‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said . . . ‘it means just what I choose it to mean.’”  
LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 79 (Dover Publications 1872). 
 13. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, sc. 2. 
 14. Matthew 26:11. 
 15. See infra Section II.B. 
 16. See Szondi & Bahti, supra note 1, at 17–28.  Although this process can be complicated, the 
basic concept is easy to grasp.  To illustrate, when my Irish wife first told me her uncle was a “chem-
ist,” I assumed he was a scientist who specialized in chemistry (the conventional understanding in 
America), whereas she meant “pharmacist” (the standard usage in the British Isles). 
[Vol. 47: 463, 2020] Comparing Literary and Biblical Hermeneutics 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
469 
as well as the author’s intent (dubbed “psychological” interpretation), and 
then close the historical and cultural gaps through translations or commen-
taries that make the text intelligible to a modern reader.17 
Contextual approaches to non-religious writings are usually grouped un-
der the broad term “Literary Theory.”18  Most relevant here is its “Structural-
ist” branch, which focuses on how individual words, phrases, sentences, and 
paragraphs fit into an overall framework—and how substance, form, style, 
and structure interact.19  For example, Othello contains many memorable say-
ings, such as “Men should be what they seem,” and “Trifles light as air are to 
the jealous confirmations strong as proofs of Holy Writ.”20  Deeper explora-
tion, however, reveals a perfectly structured play, as each sentence, scene, and 
act—which features the evil Iago planting seeds of doubt in Othello’s mind 
that his wife Desdemona is unfaithful—builds up to the climax in Act 5, when 
Othello kills her, and then realizes Iago has misled him and commits suicide.21 
Likewise, in Henry VI, Part 2, Dick the Butcher does not say “let’s kill 
all the lawyers” because they are bad.22  On the contrary, a holistic reading of 
the play reveals that Dick is part of a murderous rebel group, and he realizes 
that eliminating attorneys will lead to a breakdown in law and social order, 
which will help the renegades seize power.23 
The foregoing scholarly techniques have been borrowed from Biblical 
Studies.24  “Exegesis” seeks to unearth what a sacred text likely meant to its 
 
 17. See id. at 21–26; McKim, supra note 1, at 87–89.  This approach to hermeneutics traces to the 
early nineteenth century work of F.D.E. Schleiermacher.  He set forth methods that could be applied 
systematically to determine both the objective “grammatical” meaning of any text—literary, biblical, 
or philosophical—and the subjective intent of its author.  See Warnke, supra note 9, at 1–5. 
 18. TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION, at viii (3d ed. 2008). 
 19. See id. at 79–110.  I will use “Structuralism” in this basic integrative sense and not delve into 
the more complicated permutations that have been set forth by professors of linguistics and literature.  
See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 69–72, 100–02 (1999) (critiquing 
this scholarship). 
 20. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3. 
 21. A.C. BRADLEY, SHAKESPEAREAN TRAGEDY 49–51, 134 (Anboco 2016) (1904). 
 22. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, sc. 2. 
 23. See Jacob Gershman, To Kill or Not to Kill All the Lawyers? That Is the Question, WALL 
STREET J. (Aug. 18, 2014, 7:31 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/shakespeare-says-lets-kill-all-the-
lawyers-but-some-attorneys-object-1408329001. 
 24. See, e.g., Garet, supra note 2, at 112 (“The links in the transmission of ideas between theolog-
ical and literary interpretation can be quite complex.”).  F.D.E. Schleiermacher pioneered modern 
hermeneutics in all fields, including Bible studies.  See Warnke, supra note 9, at 2.  He accepted neutral 
theories of human understanding based on Enlightenment rationalism, but maintained that such un-
derstanding reflects “a dialogical interaction between the contemporary interpreter and the text as an 
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author and intended audience.25  This approach requires fluency in the original 
language used (say, Ancient Hebrew, Aramaic, or Greek) and knowledge of 
the linguistic and cultural conventions of the historical era in which the writ-
ing appeared.26  That original meaning has gradually become obscured as the 
Bible was translated into Latin, then re-translated into English and just about 
every other language.27 
Returning to my earlier example, “eye of the needle” may not have re-
ferred to the hole in a sewing needle.28  Rather, there are several possible 
meanings in context.  For instance, the “eye of the needle” might have signi-
fied the low and narrow gate in the wall protecting Jerusalem, which a camel 
could pass through only if it shed the goods it was carrying.29  Likewise, a rich 
man would be so laden with worldly things, and so attached to them, that he 
would have to cast them aside before he could get to heaven.30  Alternatively, 
Jesus may have been speaking hyperbolically, as he sometimes did—like 
when he told the hypocrite to remove the “beam” in his own eye before judg-
ing others.31  Third, Jesus himself illuminated his intended message when he 
followed up his “eye of the needle” image by declaring: “For human beings, 
this is impossible, but for God all things are possible.”32 
Learning the relevant ancient languages and their underlying cultures 
takes years of study.  But such mastery is just the starting point, for two dis-
tinct reasons. 
First, Judaism, Catholicism, and Orthodox Christianity hold that (1) the 
Bible has been supplemented by unwritten traditions, and (2) a hierarchical 
 
expression of past religious consciousness,” and thereby “allows for the irreducible meaningfulness 
of sacred texts.”  See Soulen & Soulen, supra note 6, at 73, 75 (summarizing the work of Schleierma-
cher and his intellectual heirs). 
 25. See McKim, supra note 1, at 86–88, 90. 
 26. See id. at 87–88, 91; PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 12–14, 28, 41–42, 104–05, 112–14; Robert L. 
Thomas, Issues of Biblical Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 29, 32–34 (1985). 
 27. See JOHN H. HAYES & CARL R. HOLLADAY, BIBLICAL EXEGESIS: A BEGINNER’S HANDBOOK 
12–13 (Westminster John Knox Press 3d ed. 2007) (1934); see also PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 12–14, 
28, 41–42, 51–52, 104–05, 108–14 (observing that a learned interpretation of the original Bible re-
quires laborious study because it was written so long ago in many ancient languages, and its subse-
quent translation into about 2000 languages has further obscured meaning). 
 28. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 29. See KENNETH E. BAILEY, THROUGH PEASANT EYES: MORE LUCAN PARABLES, THEIR 
CULTURE AND STYLE 166 (1980). 
 30. See LEON MORRIS, THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO MATTHEW 487–97 (1992). 
 31. Matthew 7:5. 
 32. Matthew 19:26. 
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institution can give an authoritative interpretation of disputed religious mate-
rials.33 
Second, the Bible is not only a compendium of religious precepts, but one 
of the world’s greatest works of literature34—and the major influence on clas-
sical Western authors ranging from Dante to Milton to Dostoyevsky to Mel-
ville.  Consequently, the tools of Literary Theory can be applied to it, espe-
cially Structuralism.35  Most obviously, almost every major saying or event in 
the New Testament has an antecedent in the Old Testament.36  Similarly, from 
a literary standpoint, poring over a Gospel word-for-word and line-by-line 
yields countless memorable insights and images, but a holistic reading reveals 
that all of the individual phrases and sentences build up to the ultimate trans-
formative event—Jesus’s death and resurrection.37 
Likewise, against the background of the entire Gospels, it becomes clear 
that Jesus did not say “the poor you will always have with you” to suggest that 
we should not care about them.38  In fact, his consistent message is exactly the 
opposite.39  Rather, what Jesus meant was that his contemporaries would only 
have him for a short time, so that those who honored him should not be criti-
cized on the ground that their money could be better spent on the poor.40 
Finally, the Bible contains an array of literary genres—such as narratives, 
poems, songs, parables, and letters—and thereby defies any “one size fits all” 
interpretive approach.41  Thus, specialization in a particular literary form is 
 
 33. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 18–27; PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 28–33, 37, 56–57; 
Garet, supra note 2, at 48, 54–55, 57–62, 67, 70–71, 74–76.  One strain of Jewish thought, however, 
recognizes the validity of individual readings of the Torah’s text.  LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 19–20, 
23–24. 
 34. See McKim, supra note 1, at 86, 90; Charles W. Collier, Law as Interpretation, 76 CHI. KENT 
L. REV. 779, 786–93 (2000); see also PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 30 (“Christian Scripture is . . . the 
supreme epic and the inexhaustible source of poetic figures or literary allusions and the most fruitful 
of all texts for thousands of musical compositions . . . .”). 
 35. See McKim, supra note 1, at 86, 90–91 (noting that many scholars have addressed how differ-
ent elements of the Bible’s text relate to each other fit into an overall framework). 
 36. See Soulen & Soulen, supra note 6, at 74; Garet, supra note 2, at 99–100; see also Szondi & 
Bahti, supra note 1, at 23–24 (illustrating this point by connecting Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice 
his son Isaac with God’s allowing the death of Jesus); PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 9, 43–44 (stressing 
that the Old Testament prophesied Jesus’s life, death, and resurrection). 
 37. See JOEL S. KAMINSKY & JOEL N. LOHR, THE HEBREW BIBLE FOR BEGINNERS 44–47 (2015). 
 38. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 39. See ANNA CASE-WINTERS, MATTHEW 291–92 (2015). 
 40. See id. at 291–93; DAVID L. TURNER, MATTHEW 619 (2008). 
 41. See PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 30, 60–61, 65–66; McKim, supra note 1, at 90–91; see also 
Soulen & Soulen, supra note 6, at 75 (describing the work of scholars like Ricouer in this area). 
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necessary to gain a full understanding of the text.42 
Applying a sophisticated contextual methodology to interpret literary and 
sacred texts has the obvious advantage of deepening our understanding of, and 
appreciation for, these works.43  The danger is becoming so technical or eso-
teric as to miss the visceral personal impact of a poem, play, novel, or biblical 
passage.44  It is like a baseball sabermetrician so obsessed with statistical anal-
ysis that he fails to see the magic of a perfectly turned double play. 
Most scholars employ contextualism.  Others, however, have used this 
approach as a baseline and added another element: the reader’s subjective 
viewpoint. 
C. The “Hermeneutic Circle” 
Interpretation has traditionally been characterized as a set of procedures 
that an informed reader could apply systematically to ascertain the definitive 
objective meaning of any text.45  More recently, however, philosophers have 
maintained that our understanding of a writing occurs through a complex di-
alogical process: Every person has historically and culturally conditioned pre-
conceptions, perspectives, prejudices, interests, traditions, purposes, and pro-
jects—as well as interactions with other readers—that profoundly affect one’s 
understanding.46  This “hermeneutic circle”—the ongoing dynamic interplay 
between text and interpreters—produces new understandings about subject 
matter that cannot be attained simply by focusing on linguistic and grammat-
ical conventions or the author’s intent.47  Indeed, one version of this theory 
 
 42. See THE LITERARY GUIDE TO THE BIBLE 5 (Robert Alter & Frank Kermode eds., 1987); see 
also C.S. LEWIS, REFLECTIONS ON THE PSALMS 3 (1958) (“[T]he Bible, since it is after all literature, 
cannot properly be read except as literature; and the different parts of it as the different sorts of litera-
ture they are.”). 
 43. See Elizabeth Struthers Malbon, Structuralism, Hermeneutics, and Contextual Meaning, 51 J. 
AM. ACAD. RELIGION 207, 207–22 (1983). 
 44. See Rita Felski, “Context Stinks!,” 42 NEW LITERARY HIST. 573, 573–90 (2011). 
 45. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 46. This theory was developed principally by Martin Heidigger and Hans-Georg Gadamer.  See 
Szondi & Bahti, supra note 1, at 17, 19–20, 26–27; Warnke, supra note 9, at 1–14.  For a well-known 
update of this approach that similarly rejects the illusion of an objective textual meaning distinct from 
the reader, see STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980). 
 47. See Szondi & Bahti, supra note 1, at 17, 19–20, 26–27; Warnke, supra note 9, at 1, 5–8.  In 
his pioneering work, Schleiermacher had a different conception of a hermeneutic circle.  In both gram-
matical and psychological interpretation, the reader begins a text with a preliminary conception of its 
whole (e.g., an ode) and a basic background of the author’s life and aims and then, after reading each 
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asserts that a text’s meaning to the reader is entirely independent on this in-
tent.48 
Biblical scholarship has followed a similar trend.  Initially, one tries to 
discern the Bible’s meaning in its historical setting, but then considers con-
temporary culture to gain a richer understanding of the message today.49  Re-
latedly, modern readers must also recognize the “hermeneutic circle”: Their 
personalities, viewpoints, linguistic conventions, and cultural norms are dy-
namically influencing their understanding of the text.50 
The “hermeneutic circle” captures the complexity of interpretation by 
bringing subjective (often subconscious) factors to the surface.51  Its main 
drawback is implied in its very name: Going around in endless intellectual 
cycles, by design, ignores or obscures the concrete message the author is at-
tempting to convey.52 
D. Summary 
The three foregoing approaches to interpretation—textualism, contextu-
alism, and the “hermeneutic circle”—have been refined into many sub-cate-
gories.  An exhaustive analysis would exceed both the scope of this essay and 
my expertise.  Rather, I have deliberately sketched these three theories in 
broad terms to illuminate analogies with the methods that are applied to con-
strue legal documents. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Judges and scholars have devoted special attention to two types of laws, 
the federal Constitution and statutes.  Each has spawned three main interpre-
tive approaches that roughly correspond with those developed by literary53 
 
part, closes the circle by gaining a complete understanding of the entire work and the author’s intent.  
See Warnke, supra note 9, at 5, 8.  By contrast, modern scholars deny the possibility of a final, total 
understanding. 
 48. See PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 93–94 (citing theorists who maintain that a writer’s intent is 
neither available nor desirable in judging literature). 
 49. See McKim, supra note 1, at 88. 
 50. See id. at 88–89, 91. 
 51. See id. at 88–89. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 376–77 (1982) (emphasizing 
that Literary Criticism debates over textual meaning have parallels in contemporary legal analysis, 
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and biblical scholars, despite some obvious ways that such legal documents 
differ from creative writing and the Bible.54 
 
particularly in constitutional theory). 
 54. Three distinctions are especially important.  First, the Constitution establishes basic govern-
ment structures and, along with statutes, sets forth legal rules—characteristics lacking in novels, po-
ems, and plays.  See PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 60; see also Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as 
Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1984) (arguing that the normative authority of legal texts makes 
them different in kind from literary ones).  The Bible falls somewhere in the middle, as it employs 
various literary forms but also contains elements of a legal code.  See PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 2, 6–
12, 30–33, 60–61, 65–66, 95.  Unlike literature or federal laws, however, the Bible is revered by its 
adherents as divinely inspired and hence worthy of belief, prayer, and actions such as worship and 
service.  See id. at 15; see also id. at 13–14 (noting that the Constitution can be amended, but not the 
Bible, except insofar as Christians might claim that the New Testament effectively “amended” the 
Old); cf. Grey, supra, at 13–20 (maintaining that the Constitution, like all legal documents and unlike 
the Bible, carries a presumption that it will be interpreted literally, even though today few believe that 
the Court is simply implementing the Constitution’s language). 
 Second, there is no recognized final authority on the meaning of literary works, and any inter-
pretation of them has no real-world effect.  By contrast, although anyone can read the Constitution 
and Bible—and those texts do not expressly say what interpretive method should be used or who can 
ultimately resolve disputes—in practice such definitive authority has been successfully asserted.  See 
PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 2, 22–33, 36, 45–48, 56–58, 65–75, 92–95.  For example, in deciding cases, 
the Supreme Court can compel enforcement of its construction of the Constitution and other laws, and 
citizens have a moral obligation to comply.  See id. at 92–95; LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 3–8 (observ-
ing that legal interpretation has coercive force, which makes application of Literary Criticism diffi-
cult).  Similarly, in hierarchical religions, a single person or group can render a conclusive interpreta-
tion of the Bible, which the faithful must obey.  See PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 30–33. 
 Third, the Bible was composed by multiple authors in several languages over many centuries 
(most recently two millennia ago) and has since been translated into countless languages, which makes 
it exceedingly hard to discern the true meaning and intent of the original text.  See id. at 109.  By 
comparison, the Constitution was written entirely in English by a single Convention in the summer of 
1787.  See id. at 104–06 (stressing that, unlike the Bible, the Constitution’s exact content is undisputed, 
and its English words are uncorrupted by translation, thereby making it easily amenable to parsing for 
English grammar and semantics).  Consequently, any competent reader can examine the original Con-
stitution, as well as the published records of the Convention and Ratification debates, and get a rea-
sonably sound understanding of its specific terms and overall purposes.  Likewise, the amendments 
were written in plain English and supported by extensive public explanations.  See WHITTINGTON, 
supra note 19, at 161–64. 
 Thus, an open-minded analysis of the Constitution’s text and related historical materials typically 
reveals the probable intended meaning, which unfortunately has been distorted over the years by Jus-
tices who did not do the necessary reading, sought to reach a result not grounded in the Constitution, 
or both.  See infra notes 69–73 and accompanying text.  My main point is that any difficulties in 
determining the original understanding of the Constitution pale in comparison to those involved in 
biblical exegesis.  See PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 61.  
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A. The Constitution 
As I have previously noted, “[m]ethods of constitutional interpretation 
range across a broad spectrum, with many important differences, subtleties, 
and overlaps.”55  For the sake of simplicity, however, I will shoehorn them 
into three groups. 
1. Textualism 
The Constitution can be interpreted by determining the ordinary meaning 
of its words.  Even the most dedicated textualists, however, examine the par-
ticular language at issue in light of related provisions and the Constitution’s 
overall framework56 (similar to Structuralism in literary and biblical studies).57 
Sometimes, that simple method works fine.  For example, Article I, Sec-
tion 8, Clause 4 empowers Congress “[t]o establish . . . uniform laws on the 
subject of bankruptcies,” which clearly authorizes debtor-creditor legislation.  
Having a similarly obvious meaning are the President’s Article II power to 
grant pardons (i.e., forgiving any crimes) and the Supreme Court’s “judicial 
 
 55. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Methods of Interpreting the Commerce Clause: A Comparative Analysis, 
55 ARK. L. REV. 1185, 1187 (2002). 
 56. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 19, at 165–67, 176; Richard Epstein, History Lean: The 
Reconciliation of Private Property and Representative Government, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 591–92 
(1995).  Here I am combining approaches that can be treated as distinct.  A textualist places heaviest 
emphasis on the likeliest understanding of the Constitution’s words held by a reasonably competent 
reader, then considers whether that plain meaning comports with structural precepts like federalism 
and separation of powers.  See Pushaw, supra note 55, at 1188.  By contrast, a structuralist reasons 
deductively by starting with broad constitutional principles, which then illuminate the particular clause 
in dispute.  See id. at 1185, 1187–91. 
 57. Genuine interpretation of any document—literary, biblical, or legal—always begins with a 
careful analysis of its text that follows its internal logical order.  See PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 33–36, 
52–53; see also id. at 36 (declaring that interpretations of the Constitution and the Bible “are certainly 
a great deal more than parsing the grammar and probing the vocabulary of an authoritative text—but 
they [can] never be less!”). 
 Literary Theory can be useful because the Constitution “is no different [than] other pieces of 
writing.”  See LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 50.  Similarly, the Constitution has long been treated as akin 
to a sacred text because it is (1) written and permanent (like religious covenants), and (2) a higher 
authority to which everyone must submit.  See id. at 11–19, 96, 151–52 (making this point, but high-
lighting the paradox that these two characteristics do not produce unity); see also PELIKAN, supra note 
2, at 2, 6–8, 15 (analogizing methods of interpreting the Bible and the Constitution because both are 
written, venerable, familiar, contain certain ordinary words that have acquired a specialized meaning, 
and have been adopted by the relevant community as establishing enduring principles that apply to all 
kinds of problems and needs—even those the authors could not foresee). 
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power” to decide “cases” (i.e., rendering a judgment after applying the gov-
erning law to the facts).58 
As with literary and biblical textualism, however, problems arise when 
the Constitution’s language is vague, ambiguous,59 or has an arcane meaning 
that a modern reader cannot readily grasp.  To illustrate, many important con-
stitutional cases concern the Fourteenth Amendment’s provision that prohibits 
states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”60  On its face, this Due Process Clause appears to have a 
straightforward meaning: Before states can take someone’s “life” (by execu-
tion), “liberty” (through physical confinement), or “property” (via a fine or 
seizure order), they must first provide traditional judicial “process.”  The Su-
preme Court has long recognized certain core procedural requirements, such 
as notice of the charges or claims and a fair trial or hearing before an impartial 
decision-maker.61 
But the Court has also construed “liberty” as importing substantive con-
tent.  Initially, the Justices incorporated against the states most of the funda-
mental liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights that limited the federal gov-
ernment—for instance, the First Amendment’s freedom of speech and 
religion;62 the Fourth Amendment’s protection against “unreasonable 
 
 58. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist 
Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 398, 402–07, 417–27, 431–34, 436–44 (1994). 
 59. Neither the original Constitution nor its amendments became legally effective until they were 
ratified by a supermajority of “We the People,” which presupposed that ordinary folks could under-
stand constitutional provisions based on standard English usage.  See WHITTINGTON, supra note 19, 
at 1–16, 47–68, 76–159, 213–19; see also Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 
404–08, 414–26, 437–38 (1985) (contending that anyone who is fluent in English can read the Con-
stitution and get a good general understanding of governmental operations and relationships, as well 
as individual rights).  But see Levinson, supra note 53, at 375 (deriding “the purported commands of 
an allegedly comprehensible Constitution”); id. at 378–79 (to similar effect).  Although the Constitu-
tion has some linguistic imperfections, Supreme Court Justices and scholars tend to exaggerate these 
flaws and to find even seemingly clear provisions to be indefinite because doing so enables them to 
claim novel meanings.  Perhaps the best example is the Court’s creative construction of the assertedly 
vague word “liberty.”  See infra notes 62–81 and accompanying text. 
 60. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 61. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267–71 (1971) (citing longstanding precedent and 
extending it to require notice and a hearing before welfare benefits are terminated). 
 62. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (speech); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940) (free exercise). 
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searches and seizures;”63 and the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and un-
usual punishment[s].”64 
That expansion was defensible on textual grounds, as “liberty” in the 
Fourteenth Amendment could reasonably be interpreted as cross-referencing 
the basic freedoms listed in the first eight Amendments.65  But the Justices 
have gone much further and interpreted “liberty” based on their perception of 
its contemporary meaning, which has reflected popular political and social 
currents.66  For example, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
conservatives defined “liberty” to include “freedom of contract” and therefore 
invalidated certain Progressive legislation designed to protect workers (e.g., 
maximum hour laws) as interfering with employment contracts.67  Such cases 
had at least an arguable basis in the original Constitution, which sought to 
protect economic liberty in various ways.68 
The Warren Court, however, began to discover “liberties” that had virtu-
ally no foundation in the Constitution by portraying it as a living document 
that contained general words which could be imbued with new meanings de-
rived from the Justices’ views about changing norms of justice, morality, and 
social progress.69  To illustrate, the Court has declared that Fourteenth Amend-
ment “liberty” includes freedom from state interference in matters such as 
 
 63. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650–60 (1961). 
 64. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962). 
 65. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 386–91 (2005) (agreeing 
with the Court’s incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, 
but arguing that the Court should have done so under the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than 
the Due Process Clause). 
 66. See, e.g., infra notes 67–73 and accompanying text. 
 67. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 627–37 (4th ed. 
2011) (citing cases). 
 68. See DAVID BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 1–39, 90–129 (2011). 
 69. See Pushaw, supra note 55, at 1205; see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-Birth Abortion and 
the Perils of Constitutional Common Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 519, 522, 526–31, 577–78, 
589 (2008) [hereinafter Pushaw, Perils]. 
 “Living constitutionalism” can be classified as a species of textualism because it focuses on the 
words of the Constitution.  See Section II.A.1.  Nonetheless, the Warren Court approach of giving 
fresh meaning to broad constitutional terms based on the felt needs and norms of modern society, even 
if that meaning could not possibly have been held by the provisions’ drafters or ratifiers, is quite dif-
ferent from traditional textualism.  See Pushaw, supra note 55, at 1208.  Thus, I recognize that “living 
constitutionalism” is usually treated as a separate category.  See id. at 1205–06. 
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contraception,70 abortion,71 and sodomy between consenting adults.72  By con-
trast, a majority of Justices have rejected other claims of “liberty,” such as the 
right to physician-assisted suicide.73 
This “living Constitution” approach might be defended because, as with 
literary and biblical works, a subjective response to the text allows the Con-
stitution to speak to us directly and with immediate relevance.74  For instance, 
living constitutionalism yielded an undiluted Fourteenth Amendment legal 
principle of “equality” that was applied to prohibit gender discrimination, 
which would strike most Americans as just, despite being contrary to the 
views of that Amendment’s drafters and ratifiers.75 
As with literary and biblical interpretation, however, language in the Con-
stitution can often be twisted to mean whatever one wishes.  Perhaps most 
importantly, “liberty” can be interpreted to include—or not include—a broad 
array of “freedoms,” so the Court’s choices are arbitrary.  For instance, putting 
morality and ethics to one side, logic hardly dictates defining “liberty” to en-
compass the freedom to terminate life at its inception (abortion),76 but not at 
its late stages (physician-assisted suicide for terminally ill patients).77  Either 
both are allowed, or neither is. 
Moreover, the Court invariably celebrates its new recognition of one 
group’s “liberty” as an unalloyed positive good, without giving proper weight 
 
 70. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481–86 (1965). 
 71. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–66 (1973). 
 72. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564–79 (2003). 
 73. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–35 (1997). 
 74. This individualized interpretation of the Constitution’s terms is similar to the Protestant focus 
on a believer’s personal, unmediated reading of the Bible itself.  See LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 18, 
26–27, 29–33, 46–47, 185; PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 2, 45–48, 100–04, 110.  Moreover, even a lay 
person who recognized the value of professionals—scholars; attorneys and judges interpreting the law; 
or spiritual leaders such as bishops, priests, ministers, or rabbis immersed in the Bible—would be loath 
to accept an “expert” opinion about the relevant text that was arbitrary or otherwise unconvincing.  See 
PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 22–30. 
 75. The Fourteenth Amendment was understood as outlawing discrimination based on race, not 
sex.  See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments, 
1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 161–64.  Nonetheless, influenced by the feminist movement of the 1960s 
and 1970s, the Court interpreted the “equality” standard and “anti-caste” principle as extending to 
gender.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 211–15, 294–96, 303–05 
(2012). 
 76. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. 
 77. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735. 
[Vol. 47: 463, 2020] Comparing Literary and Biblical Hermeneutics 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
479 
to the adverse effects on others.78  To take but one example, the Court’s crea-
tion of generous First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and press has 
effectively permitted the defamation of public figures—even those dragged 
into the public eye involuntarily.79 
Finally, allowing Justices to assert unchecked discretion to interpret “lib-
erty” (or any other term in the Constitution)—and thereby announce new 
rights as supreme law—enables them to impose their subjective views on hun-
dreds of millions of Americans.  Ceding such power to unelected, life-tenured 
judges subverts the very idea of the written Constitution as (1) the fundamen-
tal law that a supermajority of “We the People” established and can amend 
under Article V, and (2) a framework in which contested political, ideological, 
moral, and social issues can be worked out through democratic processes—
not judicial fiat.80  The Court’s practice of reading the Constitution however 
it wishes has had dramatic real-world effects that distinguish such interpreta-
tion from academic debates over the meaning of, say, Hamlet.81 
These problems with textualism and the “living Constitution” extend to 
all areas of constitutional law.  This freewheeling jurisprudence generated a 
backlash, starting in the 1980s, as conservatives embraced “originalism”: 




 78. Perhaps the most timely example is the Court’s creation of various constitutional rights for 
gays and lesbians, which has resulted in ongoing clashes with the free exercise rights of religious 
believers.  See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2017) 
(holding that a state agency did not act in a religiously neutral manner in applying its law prohibiting 
sexual-orientation discrimination to a Christian baker who declined to create a custom wedding cake 
for a gay couple, despite the Court’s recognition two years earlier of a Fourteenth Amendment right 
to same-sex marriage). 
 79. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264–84 (1964). 
 80. See Pushaw, supra note 55, at 1205 (citing Justice Scalia and Lino Graglia); see also 
WHITTINGTON, supra note 19, at 1–16, 35–62, 110–59, 195–208, 213–19.  But see Michael J. Perry, 
The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional “Interpretation,” 58 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 551, 556, 575–87 (1985) (rejecting the argument that non-originalist judicial review is un-
democratic). 
 81. See Pushaw, supra note 55, at 1205. 
 82. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 37–
48 (1997). 
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2. Originalism 
Scholars have continuously refined originalism, but have generally 
searched for three types of historical evidence.83  First, original “meaning” 
refers to the likeliest signification of the Constitution’s words to an average 
literate person, as illustrated in dictionaries, popular books, newspapers, pam-
phlets, and the like.84  Second, original “intent” identifies the purposes and 
goals of the Constitution’s Framers, which can be gleaned from the Records 
of the 1787 Philadelphia Convention.85  Third, the original “understanding” 
of those who ratified the Constitution can be pieced together from the volu-
minous published debates in each state’s ratifying convention and other con-
temporaneous sources,86 most notably The Federalist Papers. 
Of course, the Constitution was not written in a secret code, so the original 
meaning, intent, and understanding often converge.  But not always.  If there 
is a discrepancy, most originalists would assign controlling weight to the con-
temporaneous understanding,87 because the Constitution did not become law 
until conventions in at least nine of thirteen states ratified it.88  Moreover, the 
Convention delegates sometimes (1) included, but never discussed, a specific 
constitutional clause; (2) failed to anticipate a particular issue at all; or (3) 
considered the issue but could not agree on specific wording and hence com-
promised on general language.89  All of these deficiencies left future govern-
ment officials with the task of fleshing out meaning in practice.90  Finally, 
originalists emphasize that the Constitution provides that “We the People” can 
 
 83. I have long used this threefold typology.  See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Why the Supreme Court 
Never Gets Any “Dear John” Letters: Advisory Opinions in Historical Perspective, 87 GEO. L.J. 473, 
478 n.35 (1998) (citing JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 7–11, 13 (1996)). 
 84. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions 
of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 448–49, 466 (1994). 
 85. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
 86. THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1901). 
 87. See SCALIA, supra note 82, at 37–38 (insisting on the primacy of the original public under-
standing of the Constitution, regardless of the subjective intent of the Framers). 
 88. U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
 89. See Pushaw, supra note 55, at 1195. 
 90. Id.  For example, neither the Constitution nor contemporaneous historical records contain any 
express statements about the inherent powers of the federal judiciary.  See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The 
Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 822 (2001).  
Consequently, the existence and scope of such powers must be deduced from general principles of 
constitutional theory and structure, as well as early federal legislative and judicial practice.  Id. 
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amend it through specified procedures, so that the Court need not—and should 
not—imaginatively reinterpret the Constitution to keep it in tune with the 
times.91 
Originalism resembles (1) linguistic and hermeneutic analysis of the his-
torical meaning of literary texts, and (2) biblical studies that strive to unearth 
the contemporaneous sense of the language used, the intent of its author, the 
understanding of the audience, or some combination.92  Furthermore, original-
ists use a form of Literary Theory (Structuralism) to discern how a particular 
phrase in the Constitution—e.g., Congress’s power “to regulate Com-
merce . . . among the several States”—fits in with the larger framework of its 
immediately surrounding provisions, other parts of the Constitution, and 
broad animating principles like federalism and separation of powers.93 
Originalism can be justified as a faithful way to interpret the Constitution 
as true law and, relatedly, as preserving limits on judges in a constitutional 
democracy.94  Nonetheless, originalism has many drawbacks.  Most obvi-
ously, determining collective “intent” or “understanding” is difficult, and 
 
 91. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852–57, 862–64 
(1989). 
 92. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.  The New Testament and the Constitution were 
each written in a specific historical period, so contemporaneous commentary about their respective 
meanings has unique weight.  See PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 84–93. 
 An insightful study demonstrates that Biblical literalists, like constitutional originalists, believe 
that (1) texts have a fixed meaning that is readily ascertainable; (2) interpretations unmoored from text 
reflect elite opinion and result in a lack of restraint that leads to illegitimate results; and (3) original 
text must be restored.  See Peter J. Smith & Robert W. Tuttle, Biblical Literalism and Constitutional 
Originalism, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 694–95, 716–50, 762–63 (2011).  Yet Professors Smith 
and Tuttle highlight a critical difference that should give biblical fundamentalists pause before em-
bracing originalism: Such literalists strictly adhere to the text as the Word of God, which must neces-
sarily be true, good, and just.  Id. at 695, 697–709, 750–51, 754.  By contrast, originalists demand 
fidelity to the Constitution’s text, even if the outcome is one that a Christian would find bad or unjust.  
Id. at 695–97, 714–16, 751–53; cf. Frank S. Ravitch, Interpreting Scripture/Interpreting Law, 2009 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 377 (2009) (assailing “dogmatic” literalism in both biblical and constitutional in-
terpretation (including textualism and originalism) as relying on an illusion of objectivity). 
 93. See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text; see also Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, 
Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Reg-
ulations But Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4–56 (1999) (providing 
such a historical and structural analysis). 
 94. See Pushaw, supra note 55, at 1194–95.  Keith Whittington has persuasively contended that, 
because “We the People” ratified the Constitution as an authoritative written text which established a 
fundamental and fixed law that constrains government, originalism is the judiciary’s best method of 
genuinely “interpreting” the Constitution—discovering the likely intended meaning of its specific le-
gal rules (including those that limit government).  WHITTINGTON, supra note 19, at 1–16, 35–62, 77–
219.  When originalist judicial review reveals that this meaning cannot reasonably be determined, 
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therefore often the best a historian can do is narrow the range of possible 
meanings rather than pinpoint a definitive one.95  Furthermore, originalism 
requires a historian’s expertise and a vast amount of time—two resources that 
most lawyers and all the Justices lack.96  Consequently, the Court typically 
cobbles together historical tidbits provided in attorneys’ briefs to justify a re-
sult—so-called “law office history.”97  Moreover, assuming that the historical 
meaning of a constitutional provision can be accurately identified, enforcing 
it today (as strict originalists insist) is often not practical because of subse-
quent legal, political, ideological, social, moral, and economic changes.98  Fi-
nally, stare decisis requires adherence to precedent—even decisions that no 
credible historian considers correct—and all Justices (even self-styled 
originalists)99 pay more attention to cases than any other source.100 
 
however, courts should defer to the constitutional constructions of political officials.  Id. at 89–90, 
161–62, 209–12. 
 95. See Pushaw, supra note 55, at 1195, 1197, 1201. 
 96. See id. at 1191–94, 1197. 
 97. See id. at 1191. 
 98. See id. at 1195–98, 1200–02. 
 99. See SCALIA, supra note 87, at 138–39. 
 100. See Pushaw, supra note 55, at 1196–97, 1202–04 (citing distinguished scholars who have de-
veloped this argument such as Akhil Amar, Barry Cushman, Barry Friedman, Henry Monaghan, and 
David Strauss).  Once again, I recognize that a “precedential” focus on the doctrine developed in 
Supreme Court cases and the longstanding practices of the political branches could be placed into a 
separate interpretive category.  Id. 
  Anglo-American courts have gradually developed common law in areas like contracts, property, 
and torts.  “Stare decisis commands judges to follow established precedent absent compelling reasons 
for departure—most pertinently, concerns that a rule has become unacceptable in light of changed 
social conditions.  Moreover, common law is subject to legislative override.”  Pushaw, Perils, supra 
note 69, at 521.  In interpreting the Constitution, however, the modern Supreme Court has fashioned 
“an idiosyncratic common law in which stare decisis is either invoked selectively (to defend a previous 
revolutionary case implementing some preferred policy that had no constitutional roots) or flatly re-
jected, prior decisions are freely modified, and legislatures have no input.”  Id. at 525; see also id. at 
577–91 (substantiating this thesis through an analysis of the Court’s major cases).  Most importantly, 
over the past eighty years constitutional law has not evolved incrementally but rather has undergone 
two seismic shifts in which entrenched precedent was discarded wholesale.  Id. at 521–22, 577–78. 
 First, the New Deal Revolution (1937–1943) destroyed the longstanding federalist idea of lim-
ited federal power and robust state reserved power.  See id. at 522, 577. 
 Second, the Warren Court (1954–1968) “dismantled most precedent concerning individual rights 
and reinterpreted the Constitution to implement ideas about liberty and equality that incorporated pro-
gressive social and moral views.”  Id. at 522.  Except for Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 
495 (1954), which held that the Equal Protection Clause forbade state racial discrimination, these de-
cisions had almost no foundation in the Constitution itself.  Pushaw, Perils, supra note 69, at 522–23.  
The most important case, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), imaginatively read the Equal Protection 
Clause as containing a “one person, one vote” standard.  See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bush v. Gore: 
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In short, although judges and scholars routinely seek to ascertain the his-
torical understanding of the Constitution’s language, the reality is that unwrit-
ten tradition and definitive Court precedent—which sometimes stray far out-
side the text—have created doctrines that play a critical role in deciding actual 
cases.101  This process strongly resembles the Catholic approach to interpret-
ing the Bible: A final authority (the Papacy) determines the meaning of a dis-
puted provision by evaluating its text in light of history, longstanding custom, 
and precedent.102 
Despite the many problems of originalism, it has had a huge impact on 
constitutional theory and practice.103  Although conservatives developed this 
methodology, some liberal scholars have co-opted it—not as a source of en-
 
Looking at Baker v. Carr in a Conservative Mirror, 18 CONST. COMM. 359, 359–67 (2001) [hereinafter 
Pushaw, Bush v. Gore].  The Court also invented a right to privacy in sexual matters involving con-
senting adults.  See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480–86 (1965).  Other landmark Warren 
Court opinions completely reshaped constitutional criminal procedure in a pro-defendant manner and 
effectively rewrote the First Amendment Clauses concerning religion and freedom of expression.  See 
Pushaw, Perils, supra note 69, at 522, 578. 
 Remarkably, the major Warren Court cases have survived even after conservative Republicans 
attained a permanent majority in 1991.  See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Enforcing Principled Constitutional 
Limits on Federal Power: A Neo-Federalist Refinement of Justice Cardozo’s Jurisprudence, 60 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 937, 941, 960–61 (2019) [hereinafter Pushaw, Enforcing].  This durability has re-
sulted from a combination of liberal Justices who agree with the original opinion and moderate Re-
publicans like Stewart, Powell, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Roberts who feel duty-bound to honor stare 
decisis and maintain legal stability by keeping the basic holdings intact, albeit with case-by-case revi-
sions.  Pushaw, Perils, supra note 69, at 523–24, 578. 
 101. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 
1, 5–9 (1998); cf. WHITTINGTON, supra note 19, at 169–74, 213 (suggesting that the Court should 
gradually, not abruptly, modify its “living Constitution” precedent to move closer to the correct orig-
inal constitutional meaning). 
 102. Several scholars have articulated this theme of a “Catholic” method of authoritatively inter-
preting the Constitution.  See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 28–50, 185; PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 
2, 10–12, 30–36, 115–19; Garet, supra note 2, at 48–49, 55, 57, 61, 67–69, 74–77, 85, 88–89, 91–99, 
125–27, 134.  Moreover, with both the Bible and the Constitution, the “letter”—the literal, original 
meaning of the text—often is later expressed in a broader principle that captures the fuller “spirit” of 
the provision, which can be applied to new but analogous situations in an ongoing process of organi-
cally developing the doctrine in light of experience.  PELIKAN, supra note 2, at 8–12, 76–84, 115–22.  
Faithful development requires interpretations that (1) add or assimilate a concept that merely illustrates 
or corroborates a doctrine’s basic idea and permanent underlying principles, which are preserved in a 
way that demonstrates their enduring vigor; and (2) make deductions or inferences from existing doc-
trine in logical sequence.  See id. at 122–48. 
 103. See Brian A. Lichter & David P. Baltmanis, Foreword: Original Ideas on Originalism, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 491, 491–94 (2009). 
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forceable legal rules, but rather as an important foundation upon which Amer-
icans can gradually build.104 
3. Neo-Federalism and “Living Originalism” 
The most nuanced approaches to constitutional interpretation evaluate all 
relevant evidence.105  For example, Bruce Ackerman and Akhil Amar have 
applied “Neo-Federalism,” which aims to (1) recover the understanding of the 
Constitution’s text, structure, and political theory shared by its drafters and 
ratifiers, and (2) apply their classical constitutional principles and values that 
remain useful in addressing modern legal issues.106  More recently, Jack Bal-
kin has proposed “living originalism”: treating the Constitution’s historical 
meaning not as fixed law, but rather as an initial framework that is fleshed out 
through constitutional construction by all Americans (not only judges), 
thereby ensuring democratic legitimacy.107  Accordingly, the original seman-
tic meaning of constitutional language might convey determinate legal rules, 
general legal standards (like “liberty” and “equal protection”), or basic prin-
ciples (such as federalism) that can validly be employed by later generations 
in ways that those who wrote and ratified the provision did not expect.108 
Neo-Federalism and “living originalism” can be sophisticated yet practi-
 
 104. See infra Section III.A.3. 
 105. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1243–46 (1987) (observing that the conventional types of consti-
tutional argument are usually ranked in the following order of importance—text, the Framers’ intent, 
constitutional theory, precedent, and moral or policy values—but that these sources tend to be suffi-
ciently related so as to point toward a single result). 
 106. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 19–20, 34–57, 165–67 (1991); 
Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Juris-
diction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 207–09, 230–31 (1985).  I have long followed this approach.  See, e.g., 
Pushaw, supra note 58, at 397. 
 107. See JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
 108. Id. at 3–137, 256–73, 277–339.  A good illustration is the Court’s interpretation of Fourteenth 
Amendment equality as banning gender discrimination, which the drafters and ratifiers did not antic-
ipate.  See id. at 8–13, 18, 25–28, 198, 220–44, 249–55, 263–67; see also supra note 74 and accom-
panying text. 
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cal interpretive methods—as long as they are applied without political or ide-
ological bias,109 as illustrated in Professor Amar’s pathbreaking work on fed-
eral court jurisdiction110 and criminal procedure.111  Unfortunately, these ap-
proaches are often deployed not to conduct an impartial inquiry into the 
original meaning of a constitutional provision, but rather to cherry-pick his-
torical sources to support an expansive constitutional standard or principle 
that rationalizes a modern liberal policy result—for instance, the validity of 
New Deal and Great Society legislation112 or the Warren Court-created indi-
vidual rights.113 
The idea that the Constitution has an original meaning, yet can evolve, 
 
 109. See Pushaw, supra note 55, at 1206–11 (recommending and applying such “apolitical Neo-
Federalism”). 
 110. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Congressional Power Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense 
of the Neo-Federalist Interpretation of Article III, 1997 BYU L. REV. 847, 847–51, 856–64, 873–83, 
890–97 (supporting and elaborating upon the arguments in Amar, supra note 106); Akhil Reed Amar, 
Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987) (painstakingly recapturing the original 
meaning of popular sovereignty and federal-state relations to challenge various Supreme Court doc-
trines, most notably state sovereign immunity). 
 111. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 
(1997) (rejecting the conventional liberal wisdom praising the Court for creating strong new protec-
tions for accused criminals under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments—most importantly, argu-
ing that the remedy for unlawfully obtained evidence should not be excluding evidence and letting the 
guilty walk, but rather civil damages suits and sanctions). 
 112. See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 55, at 1207–08 (elaborating upon this criticism of Professor 
Ackerman). 
 113. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 75, at 84, 88, 112–21, 126–27, 129, 146, 151–56, 159–67, 170–
76, 179–89, 192–99, 211–30, 271, 288, 357, 387, 441, 463. 
 For instance, abundant linguistic and historical evidence reveals that the interstate “commerce” 
Congress could regulate included a core of voluntary “trade” (buying, selling, and transporting goods), 
as well as related activities geared toward the marketplace such as manufacturing goods for sale and 
paid services like banking, insurance, and labor.  See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 93, at 9–67 (citing 
thousands of supporting sources).  Nonetheless, Professors Amar and Balkin claim that “commerce” 
originally meant “interaction” (not merely economic but also social and political), which gives Con-
gress historical cover to regulate anything it deems to be in the national interest or beyond the compe-
tence of individual states—including virtually all modern liberal federal laws.  See AMAR, supra note 
65, at 107–08; Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REv. 1, 5–6, 15–29 (2010).  Remarkably, 
Amar and Balkin do not cite anyone during the era of the Constitution’s framing, ratification, or early 
implementation who suggested such an expansive view of “commerce,” but instead selectively cobble 
together obscure references to their preferred meaning from irrelevant foreign sources and non-legal 
English usages that had often become obsolete by 1787.  See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Obamacare and 
the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause: Identifying Historical Limits on Congress’s Powers, 
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1703, 1705–54. 
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bears some resemblance to the cyclical method of literary and biblical inter-
pretation.114  In particular, the initial step is always to ascertain the historical 
understanding of a text.115  The next inquiry for literary or biblical scholars is 
to recognize that, just as the words are transmitting meanings to the reader, 
his or her subjective perspective is affecting the meaning attributed to the 
text—the hermeneutic circle.116  By contrast, no Justice—and few lawyers—
would publicly endorse the legitimacy of injecting one’s personal views 
(whether based on politics, ideology, religion, morality, or idiosyncratic ex-
periences) to determine the legal meaning of the Constitution.117 
That reticence reflects the classical Anglo-American idea that judges im-
partially identify and apply an objective “law” consisting of stable rules.118  
As social scientists have demonstrated, however, judges’ personal attitudes 
significantly affect their legal decision-making.119  Yet even the most activist 
Justices, liberal or conservative, cloak their preferences behind a veil of for-
mal legal analysis by citing (however selectively) the Constitution’s text, 
structure, history, and precedent.120 
The foregoing discussion suggests that it is extremely difficult for consti-
 
 114. See supra Section II.C. (discussing the “hermeneutic circle”). 
 115. See supra Section II.A. (describing the primacy of textual analysis).  But see Henry L. Cham-
bers, Jr., Biblical Interpretation, Constitutional Interpretation, and Ignoring Text, 69 MD. L. REV. 92 
(2009) (contending that Christians sometimes disregard biblical text that is inconsistent with core prin-
ciples of Jesus’s ministry, and that interpreters of the Constitution can likewise rely on its overarching 
principles such as equality to justify results that conflict with individual constitutional provisions). 
 116. See supra Section II.C. 
 117. The modern Literary Theory tenet that texts inherently have no ascertainable objective mean-
ing, but rather depend on the reader’s subjective views, is inconsistent with basic premises of law—
and would render futile any effort to develop constitutional legal principles and interpretive methods.  
See WHITTINGTON, supra note 19, at 47–77, 88–109, 176–82; cf. David Couzens Hoy, Interpreting 
the Law: Hermeneutical and Poststructuralist Perspectives, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 136, 137–76 (1985) 
(recognizing that literary deconstructionists have influenced Critical Legal Studies (CLS) academics 
to assert that legal “interpretation” does not seek an objective understanding of text but instead dis-
guises and reinforces political, social, and economic inequality, but arguing that CLS adherents do not 
fully understand Literary Theory and also exaggerate the subjectivity involved in reading legal docu-
ments).  But see Levinson, supra note 53, at 375–77, 384–96 (lamenting, but accepting, that legal 
writings are intrinsically indeterminate). 
 118. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to “Accidental” Plaintiffs: Lessons 
From Environmental and Animal Law Cases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1, 66–67, 76 (2010). 
 119. See Tracey E. George & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., How Is Constitutional Law Made?, 100 MICH. 
L. REV. 1265, 1265–76 (2002) (summarizing the “attitudinal” and “strategic” models of judicial be-
havior, which show that judges rationally seek to maximize their preferences). 
 120. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES 31–34 (2005). 
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tutional interpreters to remain neutral.  The very awareness of this fact, how-
ever, can enhance objectivity in fair-minded legal thinkers by leading them to 
consciously recognize their biases and attempt to overcome them.  Thus, a 
good test to determine if a method of constitutional interpretation is impartial 
is whether its application leads to a variety of results—liberal, conservative, 
and moderate.121 
B. Statutory Interpretation 
Parties often contest the meaning of a particular word, phrase, or provi-
sion in a statute.  The appropriate way to resolve such disputes has received 
ever-increasing attention over the past few decades.  The many permutations 
of statutory interpretation can be boiled down to three main approaches: tex-
tualist, pragmatic, and dynamic.122 
1. Textualism 
Today, no Justice or reputable scholar employs the simple method fa-
vored by old-fashioned literary or biblical interpreters: effectuating the 
reader’s subjective perception of the “plain meaning” of written language.  
Rather, modern “textualists” have borrowed insights from linguists and liter-
ary Structuralists.  The aim is to determine the ordinary semantic meaning of 
words—their most likely usage to a reasonable person familiar with both pre-
vailing linguistic conventions (such as dictionary definitions and standard 
 
 121. I have tried to do so by applying an “apolitical Neo-Federalist” approach.  See Pushaw, supra 
note 55, at 1209–11.  For example, I have published extensive scholarship urging federal courts to 
either exercise or decline jurisdiction in specific factual contexts, regardless of whether that result will 
affect access for plaintiffs with liberal or conservative views.  See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 58, at 399, 
472–512 (setting forth neutral rules of standing, ripeness, mootness, and the political question doctrine 
grounded in the Constitution’s text, history, and separation-of-powers structure); Robert J. Pushaw, 
Jr., A Neo-Federalist Analysis of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1515, 1516–19, 
1541–71 (2007) (proposing objective, historically rooted Article III principles for determining whether 
a case “arises under” federal law).  Similarly, I have developed, along with Grant Nelson, a textually 
and historically based Commerce Clause framework that has been criticized on both the right (for 
allowing too much federal regulatory legislation) and the left (for not permitting Congress unlimited 
power to regulate non-commercial issues to achieve liberal social and cultural goals).  See Pushaw, 
Obamacare, supra note 113, at 1708–34, 1738–43, 1750–54; see also Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 
93, at 119 (predicting such criticism). 
 122. The following analysis is a condensed version of a lengthy article.  See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., 
Talking Textualism, Practicing Pragmatism: Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Approach to Statutory 
Interpretation, 51 GA. L. REV. 121 (2016). 
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grammar) and the statute’s context, particularly its subject matter and overall 
structure.123  Textualism was the dominant form of statutory interpretation un-
til the 1940s, was revived by Justice Scalia and others in the 1980s, and is now 
the majority approach.124 
2. Pragmatism 
Pragmatists such as Justice Breyer assume that language does not have a 
single plain meaning, but is usually ambiguous or vague.125  Therefore, the 
statute’s text, while important, is merely the starting point that must be illu-
minated by other evidence such as (1) Congress’s general purposes and policy 
goals; (2) its specific intent manifested in legislative history (i.e., how the bill 
evolved, including comments by members); and (3) cases interpreting similar 
statutory verbiage.126  Because all of this evidence typically points in different 
directions, one must choose the construction that will produce the optimal 
practical result.127 
The main problem with pragmatism is that, as applied, it gives judges vast 
discretion, which is usually exercised to reach outcomes that conform to their 
political, ideological, or personal preferences.128  For example, a clever judge 
can often define Congress’s overarching purpose at a very high level of gen-
erality (e.g., to “help the poor” or “clean the environment”), and then twist a 
specific provision beyond all recognition to further that goal.129  Likewise, it 
is easy to comb through legislative history and find a remark by some Repre-
sentative or Senator that a statute means X, even though it says Y.130  Such 
legislators hope that a judge will later seize on that statement to support the 
incorrect interpretation—one that they could not persuade their fellow mem-
bers to incorporate into the final statute.131 
Pragmatism bears some resemblance to contextualism in literary and bib-
lical interpretation insofar as it considers the text in light of history (i.e., the 
 
 123. See id. at 123, 131–32, 158–60, 170–73, 231. 
 124. See id. at 143–78, 230. 
 125. See id. at 123, 163, 169. 
 126. See id. at 123–24, 129–30, 150–58, 163–67, 172–73, 230. 
 127. See id. at 124, 129–30, 166–67, 225–27, 230. 
 128. See id. at 124, 130–31, 169, 226–33. 
 129. See id. at 130–31, 157–58. 
 130. See id. at 131, 169, 231. 
 131. See id. at 130–31, 156–58, 231. 
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legislative record preceding enactment).132  Unlike those nonlegal types of in-
terpretation, however, pragmatism often does not lead judges to consult this 
history to determine the probable meaning of a statute’s language but rather 
to give them cover in rewriting the law.133 
3. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 
Under this approach, the meaning intended by the enacting legislature is 
not binding.134  Instead, if the judge concludes that the statute has become 
outdated or insufficiently effective, he or she can adjust the law to accommo-
date changed circumstances.135 
Dynamic statutory interpretation has the virtue of intellectual honesty, but 
the vice of undermining the Constitution’s system of separation of powers.136  
Article I grants Congress “legislative power” to enact and amend statutes ac-
cording to the voters’ will, whereas Article III grants courts only “judicial 
power”—to apply that law to the facts, not revise it based on the judge’s opin-
ion that the legislature should have changed the statute.137 
Dynamic statutory interpretation is quite similar to “Living Originalism” 
in constitutional law and the “hermeneutic circle” in literary and biblical stud-
ies, as the reader’s personal perspectives shape the text’s meaning.138  Not 
surprisingly, all of these approaches suffer from the same fatal flaw: The 
reader is no longer actually “interpreting” a text (i.e., trying to determine its 
meaning), but rather is imposing his or her views onto the text.139  
Over the past thirty years, Supreme Court Justices have increasingly used 
textualist rhetoric, but made decisions pragmatically or dynamically.140  By 
following this odd course, the Justices have arrogated to themselves vast 
 
 132. See supra Section II.B. 
 133. See Pushaw, supra note 122, at 124, 131, 169, 225. 
 134. See id. at 168–69. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See id. at 171. 
 137. See id. at 131–32, 140–43, 160–61, 169, 231–32. 
 138. See supra notes 45–52, 107–08 and accompanying text. 
 139. See supra notes 46–48.  Of course, the “hermeneutic circle” model would reject such a dichot-
omy between objective interpretation and subjective interposition of the reader’s perspective.  See 
supra Section II.C.  As applied to legal texts, however, such an approach would effectively reject the 
entire premise of written law—that people will understand what the government prescribes and pro-
scribes.  See supra notes 114–120 and accompanying text.  
 140. See Pushaw, supra note 122, at 124, 129, 171–78, 225–30, 233. 
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power to effectively amend any statute while denying that they are doing so.141  
And the Court tends to get away with such subterfuge.142 
Nonetheless, such politically driven decisions have gradually eroded 
Americans’ respect for the Court and the very ideal of impartial law.  That is 
why I have argued that the Court should consistently apply a rigorous textu-
alist approach.143  Congress’s enacted text is the law, and courts have a duty 
to enforce it.144  Once they venture beyond the text to consider general pur-
poses, legislative history (which often runs thousands of pages and would be 
impossible for even the most conscientious judge to read in full), or real-world 
policy results, the judges inevitably substitute their own views for those of the 
legislature.145  That violates separation of powers, which presupposes that 
courts will merely implement a statute as written and that Congress, if it 
chooses, can amend it.146 
 
 
 141. See id. at 124–25, 225–27, 230, 233.  The most famous recent example involved a statutory 
provision, enacted under Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce, that required all Ameri-
cans to purchase health insurance or pay a “penalty.”  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 
2013 (ACA), 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2017).  All of the Justices declared that they were applying a textu-
alist approach, but only four of them actually did so by holding that a “penalty” was a “penalty” (i.e., 
a monetary punishment for violating a regulatory law).  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 
567 U.S. 519, 661–69 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 However, Chief Justice Roberts and four colleagues ruled that the “penalty” under the Com-
merce Clause could also be read as a “tax” (i.e., an enforced contribution to support the government), 
and thus sustainable under Congress’s Taxing Clause power, which is virtually plenary.  Id. at 561–
74 (Roberts, C.J.); accord id. at 589, 623 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, Sotomayor & Kagan, JJ., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part).  That conclusion was so bizarre that it can be rationally ex-
plained primarily as a political and pragmatic calculus.  In the summer before the 2012 Presidential 
election, five Republican Justices would have incurred sharp public criticism for striking down the 
signature achievement of the incumbent Democratic President.  See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Para-
dox of the Obamacare Decision: How Can the Federal Government Have Limited Unlimited Power?, 
65 FLA. L. REV. 1993, 1994–99, 2026–33, 2041–53 (2013). 
 142. See Pushaw, supra note 122, at 125, 129, 229 (suggesting that the Court has succeeded because 
(1) it is held in much higher esteem than Congress, and (2) any particular statute at issue usually is of 
interest to a very small group). 
 143. See id. at 131–33, 229–33. 
 144. See id. at 131–33. 
 145. See id. at 130–32. 
 146. See id. at 131–32, 139–49, 160–61, 171. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The textual, contextual, and “hermeneutic circle” methods of reading lit-
erary and biblical texts have influenced interpretation of the federal Constitu-
tion and statutes, even if legal analysts have often been unaware of this impact.  
Indeed, every approach to constitutional and statutory construction has an an-
tecedent or analogue in literary or biblical hermeneutics. 
At this moment, five Justices—Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Ka-
vanaugh—have formally declared that they are constitutional originalists and 
statutory textualists.147  Officially, then, the Court is properly moving away 
from a free-form “interpretation” that actually amends the Constitution and 
statutes.  Nonetheless, those Justices (especially Roberts) should be more con-




 147. See John O. McGinnis, Which Justices Are Originalists?, LAW & LIBERTY (Nov 9, 2019), 
https://www.lawliberty.org/2018/11/09/which-justices-are-originalists. 
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